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Abstract: Per pupil expenditures on education in the United States have grown immensely in recent decades, yet student 
achievement has been stagnant. An abundance of research has sought to solve this enigma, much of it centered on the 
incentive structure facing administrators. Some recent papers use TIMSS data to analyze the relationship between 
institutional arrangements—that typically do not vary within a single country—and student achievement. Similarly, we 
utilize TIMSS 1999 to determine if there is an indirect relationship between institutional arrangements and student 
achievement, via a relationship with school efficiency. Our results show that the specified link between institutional 
arrangements and student achievement (direct or indirect) is important in certain instances and confirm evidence found in 
previous research that certain arrangements are beneficial or detrimental to student achievement, regardless of the 
specification chosen. 
Keywords: Student achievement, institutions, efficiency. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 Real per pupil expenditures in the U.S. increased from 
$2,670 in the 1960-1961 school-year to $9,266 in the 2004-
2005 school-year (figures are in constant 2006-2007 U.S. 
dollars), while pupil-teacher ratios fell from 27.4 in 1960 to 
15.4 in 2005 [1]. Obviously policymakers in this country 
believe that increased educational funding will lead to 
increased school quality (student achievement). Alas, student 
achievement has not shown any improvement over the past 
several decades [2, 3]. Research on the impact of so-called 
school inputs (i.e. teacher education, teacher salaries, etc.) 
has resulted in scant evidence of a link between these inputs 
and student achievement. Hanushek [4] sums up this 
literature by saying, “A wide range of analyses indicate that 
overall resource policies have not led to discernible 
improvements in student performance.” 
 In response to the lack of a significant relationship 
between school resources and student performance, many 
researchers have directed their attention toward the 
incentives faced by school teachers and administrators. A 
common conclusion is that schools are plagued by 
inefficiency, and that inefficiency will persist until the 
incentive structure is altered [4-6]. Studies analyzing 
inefficiency in public schools have been able to locate the 
missing relationship between school resources and student 
performance [7, 8]. Additionally, Collier and Millimet [9] 
find some evidence to support the notion that increased 
competition leads to increased efficiency in public schools, 
but only in districts that operate in financially flexible 
environments. Duncombe et al. [10] use Data Envelopment 
Analysis (DEA) and report lower levels of cost efficiency in  
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districts facing greater competition as measured by private 
school enrollment. 
 The large majority of the research on education focuses 
on data collected within the United States. There are plenty 
of exceptions to this rule [11, 12]; however, even less research 
has included data collected from multiple countries. A 
number of recent papers have used the Trends in Internat-
ional Mathematics and Science Study (TIMSS), an internat-
ional project that collects data every four years on: student 
achievement scores, family background, class, school, and 
country characteristics [3, 9, 13-15]. 
 Woessman [15], in a seminal paper using data from 
TIMSS 1995, finds that the following institutional 
characteristics have significant positive impacts on student 
achievement: central examinations, centralized control 
mechanisms in curricular and budgetary affairs, school 
autonomy in process and personnel decisions, individual 
teachers having both incentives and powers to select 
appropriate teaching methods, limited influence of teachers' 
unions, scrutiny of students' educational performance, 
encouragement of parents to take interest in teaching matters, 
and intermediate level of administration performing 
administrative tasks and educational funding, and 
competition from privately managed schools. His research 
shows that a combination of all positive influencing 
institutional arrangements leads to a test-score increase of 
almost two standard deviations (ceteris paribus) over the 
least conducive arrangement. 
 Similarly, Collier and Millimet [9] take a distributional 
approach, testing the institutional arrangements using 
quantile treatment effects, and find that many of the 
conditional mean results in Woessman [15] do not hold for 
the entire distribution of student test scores. 
 The drawback to Collier and Millimet [9] and Woessman 
[15] is that they allow only for a direct relationship between 
the institutional characteristics and student test scores. From 
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a theoretical standpoint, it is more likely that the institutional 
arrangements have an indirect relationship with student 
achievement. Following this same logic, Dustmann et al. 
[16] analyzed the impact of class size in secondary school on 
earnings later in life using data from England. While 
previous studies have failed to uncover any relationship 
between measures of school quality and subsequent labor 
market outcomes, the authors did find a positive impact by 
specifying the exact linkage. Specifically, the authors 
hypothesized that secondary school class size affects the 
probability of attending college and college attendance 
affects subsequent earnings. The data supported the 
hypothesis. Thus, the authors were able to establish a 
relationship between secondary school quality and earnings 
through the utilization of a two-step modeling approach. 
 This paper adds to the literature in two ways: (i) provides 
another analysis using cross-country data and (ii) analyzes 
the way in which institutional factors enter the educational 
production function (i.e. directly or indirectly via an 
association with efficiency). This relationship will be tested 
by estimating efficiency at the school level; and then 
estimating the relationship, if any, of the institutional 
arrangements with this efficiency. These results are 
compared to the results using a standard ordinary least 
squares model (OLS) with the institutional arrangements 
included as regressors. 
 Many of the institutional arrangements tested here are 
found to have different coefficient estimates across the two 
models utilized. However, in none of these instances do the 
signs of the coefficients differ and hold statistical 
significance. The differences that do exist could be an 
indication that the true relationship between these 
institutional arrangements and student achievement is 
actually an indirect one; via a relationship with school 
efficiency. These differences could also result simply from a 
mis-specification of either model. Further research is needed 
to confirm the appropriate relationship. 
 This paper does confirm the results of some of the 
previous research on institutional arrangements in education. 
Consistent with Collier and Millimet [9] and Woessman 
[15], we find that school autonomy in purchasing supplies 
has a positive relationship with student achievement and 
efficiency, and that teachers' unions having a large influence 
on curriculum is associated with lower levels of student 
achievement and school efficiency [9, 15]. 
 The remainder of this paper is organized as the 
following. Section 2 describes the estimation techniques 
used herein. Section 3 gives an overview of the data. Section 
4 discusses the results. Section 5 concludes. 
2. METHODOLOGY 
 A two-stage model will be used to test whether the 
institutional arrangements discussed in this paper have any 
association with efficiency in schools. The first-stage entails 
estimation of school level efficiency; the second-stage 
analyzes the relationships between institutional 
characteristics and efficiency. Each stage is discussed in 
turn. 
2.1. Efficiency Estimation 
 The panel data production function estimator of Schmidt 
and Sickles [17] is used to estimate the school level 
efficiency. The panel data production function estimator is 
very appealing, given that it reduces to the standard fixed 
effects linear regression model. Alternative approaches exist, 
including nonparametric Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) 
and maximum likelihood stochastic frontier models. DEA 
models are criticized for their inability to account for 
stochastic error. Maximum likelihood models assume a 
parametric distribution for the inefficiency term (usually 
half-normal or exponential), and require the inefficiency to 
be independent across observations, as well as uncorrelated 
with the choice of inputs. Monte Carlo simulations have 
shown the maximum likelihood models to be outperformed 
by both DEA and the panel data production function 
estimator. Additionally, the assumption of an inefficiency 
term that is uncorrelated with the choice of inputs could be 
problematic in answering the research question of this paper. 
 The production function for student achievement can be 
written as 
yisk = ? + xisk ? – usk + ?isk           (1) 
where yisk is a measure of student achievement for student i 
in school s in country k, xisk is a vector of inputs, usk is the 
level of technical inefficiency in school s in country k, and 
?isk represents purely idiosyncratic shocks which are 
uncorrelated with the choice of inputs. Consistent with the 
interpretation of u as an inefficiency term, it is assumed that 
usk >0 for all s, k. 
 Grouping the intercept and the technical inefficiency 
term, equation (1) may be re-written as 
yisk = (? – usk) + xisk ? + ?isk 
      = ? sk + xisk ? + ?isk           (2) 
 Given the above assumption concerning the error term, ?, 
equation (2) may be estimated using the standard fixed 
effects (`within') estimator. Estimates of usk that are strictly 
non-negative are then given by the deviation between each 





{?? sk}??? sk ? 0            (3) 
 By construction, the most efficient class is deemed 
completely efficient. The technical efficiency measure used 
in the second-stage analysis (discussed in the next section) is 
defined as te
?
sk = exp(? u? sk ) , which is bound by zero and 
unity. As shown in Schmidt and Sickles [17], te
?
sk  provides a 
consistent estimate of tesk as N,T ??. In the present context 
N refers to the number of schools, and T refers to the number 
of students in each school. 
 Two potential drawbacks to the Schmidt and Sickles [17] 
approach have been documented in the literature, and are 
worth mentioning. First, technical inefficiency, u, is assumed 
to be invariant across students in the same school. Second, 
all heterogeneity across observations is counted as 
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inefficiency. In other words, excluding the inefficiency term 
in equation (1) there is no other source of individual 
heterogeneity. The former is not problematic in the present 
context; it would make little sense for a school to have 
differing efficiency levels across its students. However, the 
latter drawback is somewhat problematic in this instance, 
because of the limited number of variables that vary within a 
school. 
2.2. Determinants of Efficiency 
 The second-stage estimation of the determinants of 
efficiency uses a standard ordinary least squares approach. 
The technical efficiency estimated in the first stage is now 
regressed on different institutional arrangements to find their 
association, if any, with efficiency. The estimated equation 
for school-level efficiency is 
te
?
sk = ? + zsk?
_
+? sk            (4) 
where te
?
sk  is the technical efficiency measure from the first 
stage at the school-level, zsk
_
is a vector of institutional 
arrangements at the school-level, ? is the parameter of 
interest, as it represents the slope estimates on the 
institutional arrangements, and ?sk represents measurement 
error due to the need to estimate technical efficiency. 
 Although the efficiency estimates are regressed on an 
extensive set of institutional arrangements, it is possible that 
there are other unobservables that affect efficiency. Due to a 
lack of sufficient instrumental variables, this problem is 
unavoidable in the present context. As a result, these 
findings may only be identifying correlations and not causal 
relationships; nonetheless, the results are important for 
comparison to Woessman [15]. 
2.3. Ordinary Least Squares 
 Finally, we also estimate a standard educational 
production function using an ordinary least squares model 
(OLS) with the institutional arrangements included as 
regressors. This model can be written as: 
yisk = ? + xisk ? + zsk? + ?isk          (5) 
where yisk is a measure of student achievement for student i 
in school s in country k, xisk is a vector of inputs, zsk is a 
vector of institutional arrangements in school s in country k, 
and ?isk represents purely idiosyncratic shocks which are 
uncorrelated with the choice of inputs. 
3. DATA 
 The data are obtained from the 1999 Trends in 
International Mathematics and Science Study (TIMSS)1. 
TIMSS 1999 contains student, teacher and school 
background information across 38 different countries. The 
database includes responses of students, teachers and school 
principals on background questionnaires, as well as student 
achievement scores on internationally comparable math and 
science exams. The TIMSS 1999 dataset targeted “students 
                                                           
1The TIMSS 2003 dataset has been released as well; however, it does not 
include all of the institutional variables used herein. 
enrolled in the upper of the two adjacent grades that contain 
the largest proportion of 13-year olds at the time of testing" 
[18]. The student background questionnaires contain 
information on family background (such as parents' levels of 
education, and household composition), student 
demographics, and classroom activities. The teacher 
background questionnaire provides information on the 
teacher (such as age, gender, experience and education), the 
class (such as its size), the teacher's responsibilities (such as 
purchasing supplies and hiring teachers), and the availability 
of materials. The principal background questionnaire 
includes information on the school's characteristics, its 
degree of centralization in decision-making, and its 
distribution of responsibilities for a number of tasks. 
 Many of the questionnaire responses were transformed 
into categorical variables for the analysis. Further, the 
original database includes a number of students, teachers and 
principals that are missing responses, either because they 
failed to answer the questions, or because they were not 
administered the questions. This missing data would severely 
diminish the size of the data set, so the procedure detailed in 
Woessman [15] is followed to impute missing variables in 
the TIMSS 1999 data. Finally, we incorporate additional 
information from the World Education Indicators (WEI) 
1999 a dataset collected jointly by the Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and the 
UNESCO Institute for Statistics (UIS) on per capita gross 
domestic product (GDP) and educational expenditures per 
student in each country.2 Data on GDP per capita and 
educational expenditures per student were not available for 
every country, so we are left with 28 countries and a total 
pool of over 120,000 individual students. From this full 
sample, we also estimate comparisons with sub-samples of 
countries that (i) are members of the Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and (ii) 
have curriculum-based external exit exams (CBEEEs). 
 Our measures of student achievement come from the 
mathematics and science scores of students who were 
administered proficiency tests as a part of the TIMSS survey. 
The tests were a combination of multiple choice and open 
response questions, where a considerable degree of care was 
placed on making the tests internationally comparable across 
languages and cultures.3 
 An extensive set of individual, class, and teacher 
characteristics available from the TIMSS data are used to 
obtain the technical efficiency measures. Specifically, the 
vector x in (1) includes the following (in addition to a 
constant term): 
 Individual: age, a gender dummy, and a dummy for 
whether the student was born in the country of current 
residence; 
                                                           
2Some countries did not have GDP per capita and expenditure per student 
data available in the given year (1999), so it was supplemented, if available, 
by the previous year (1998). 
3To limit the demands placed on test takers, each student was given only a 
subset of the full test. Item response theory methods were then utilized to 
insure the comparability of students taking different subsets [27]. 
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 Family: two dummies for the highest level of education 
of the student's parents (at least a secondary education and at 
least a university education, versus not having a secondary 
education), a dummy for whether both parents were born in 
the country, four dummies for the number of books in the 
student's home (1-10 books, 11-25 books, 26-100 books, and 
101-200 books, versus having more than 200 books), and a 
dummy for whether the student resides with both parents; 
 Class: class size; 
 Teacher: age, a gender dummy, years of teaching 
experience, three dummies indicating the highest level of 
education (a secondary degree, a bachelor's degree, and a 
master's degree or higher, versus not having a secondary 
degree); 
 Additionally, institutional characteristics from the 
TIMSS data and country specific variables from WEI are 
used in the second-stage analysis. Specifically, the vector 
z
_
in equation (4) includes the following: 
 Country Specifics: GDP per capita, and the level of 
education expenditures per student. 
 Influences on Curriculum: dummies indicating how 
much influence the following items have on the curriculum: 
external exams, individual teachers, subject teachers as a 
group, all teachers collectively, and teachers' unions; 
 Distribution of Responsibility: dummies indicating 
whether teachers, school administrators, or individuals 
outside of the school are responsible for the following duties: 
hiring teachers, deciding the school budget, purchasing 
supplies, and determining teacher salaries. 
 Teacher Influence: dummies indicating whether or not 
the teacher exerts a large influence on the following: the 
amount of money to be spent on supplies, what supplies are 
purchased, the subject matter taught, and the textbook 
chosen for the class. 
4. RESULTS 
 We estimate both Cobb-Douglas and translog production 
functions. The F-test of the joint significance of the 
interaction terms in the translog model rejects the restrictions 
imposed in the Cobb-Douglas form at the p<0.05 confidence 
level. Despite this, the results are similar to those in the 
translog models and are not discussed here for the sake of 
brevity, but are available from the author upon request. The 
first-stage translog production function estimates are shown 
in Table 1. The table includes four estimates; one each for 
math and science scores using the OLS model of equation 
(5) and one each for math and science scores using the fixed 
effects model shown in equation (1). There are 170 
interaction terms used in the translog model, but these are 
suppressed in the tables. They are available from the author 
upon request. The first-stage results are not the main focus of 
this paper; however, it is important to note that the only 
variable that is significant in the fixed effects model for both 
math and science is the student’s age. This is obviously 
specific to the student, and thus outside the control of school 
administrators. This finding is consistent which Hanushek's 
review of the education literature, which concludes that 
observable school inputs do not matter. 
 The focus of this paper is to compare the results of 
allowing institutional arrangements to impact educational 
achievement directly with the results of forcing the 
institutional arrangements to impact education achievement 
indirectly through a relationship with school-level efficiency. 
Thus, although the OLS model includes all the inputs of the 
fixed effects model, plus the institutional arrangements, we 
break up the results of the OLS model into two tables. Table 
1, as discussed above, includes the same inputs included in 
the fixed effects model. Table 2 includes the coefficient 
estimated on the institutional arrangements from the OLS 
model and the coefficient estimated on the institutional 
arrangements from the regression on school-level efficiency 
(equation (4)). 
 As you can see from Table 2, the sign of the coefficient 
estimates are the same across the two models for all of the 
institutional variables, except for teachers being held 
responsible for deciding the school budget in science. The 
level of statistical significance of the estimates does vary 
some across the two models; however, it is not clear which 
specification is more accurate. 
4.1. Baseline Results 
4.1.1. Distribution of Responsibility 
 The responsibility for certain actions is divided between 
the schools being held responsible, the teachers being held 
responsible, or someone outside of the school holding the 
responsibility. The models analyzed here include dummy 
variables indicating that schools are responsible or teachers 
are responsible. Consonant with the literature, it is 
hypothesized that decentralization of decision-making 
authority leads to gains in efficiency in educational 
production if schools and teachers can make more informed 
decisions due to community specific information [19, 20]. 
Responsibility for Hiring Teachers 
 The school dummy has a positive coefficient for hiring 
teachers in both math and science and in both the direct OLS 
and indirect efficiency models. However, these coefficient 
estimates are statistically significant at the 1% level in both 
math and science fixed effects models, whereas they are 
statistically insignificant in both math and science OLS 
models. The coefficients on the dummy for teachers holding 
this responsibility are negative, but not statistically 
significant in any of the subject and model combinations. 
These results suggest that giving schools the responsibility 
for hiring teachers is associated with higher levels of 
efficiency, as compared with the responsibility lying with 
teachers or someone outside of the school. This result is 
similar to the finding in Woessman [15] that students in 
schools who are given the autonomy over hiring decisions 
score significantly higher on math and science tests. Vegas 
[21] finds that decentralization of decision-making authority 
has a positive impact on student achievement. This would 
coincide with schools and/or teachers having responsibility 
for hiring teachers (and the other responsibilities discussed in 
this paper) as opposed to someone outside of the school 
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holding the responsibility. The coefficient on the school 
dummy for hiring teachers in the fixed effects models ranges 
in size from 0.0121 to 0.0174, meaning that schools that 
have autonomy in hiring teachers are 1.21 to 1.74 percent 
more efficient than schools without this autonomy. 
Responsibility for Deciding School Budget 
 The school dummy for deciding the school budget has 
positive coefficients in math and science in both models; 
however, they are only statistically significant in the OLS 
models. The teacher dummy for deciding the school budget 
has positive coefficients in math and science using OLS and 
in math using the fixed effects model, but the coefficient in 
science using the fixed effect model is negative. Only the 
result in math using OLS is statistically significant (at the 
5% level). 
 The results in Woessman [15] are consistent with the 
hypothesis formed in Bishop and Woessman [19] and Fuchs 
and Woessman [20], that decentralization in decision-
making increases educational efficiency; although, the 
findings presented here suggest that decentralization to the 
teacher level may have limited benefits in science. 
Responsibility for Purchasing Supplies 
 The coefficients on the school and teacher dummies for 
purchasing supplies are positive and statistically significant 
in both subjects using both models. Additionally, the sizes of 
the coefficients on the teacher dummies are also larger than 
those on the school dummies. This result shows that schools 
in which teachers have autonomy in purchasing supplies are 
4.76 to 7.09 percent more efficient than schools without this 
autonomy. 
Responsibility for Teacher Salaries 
 The coefficients on the school dummy for deciding 
teacher salaries have positive signs in all four of the 
specifications, with three of them having statistical 
significance (all but the coefficient estimate in science using 
OLS). The coefficients on the teacher dummy are negative 
in both subjects using both models. This suggests that 
schools holding the responsibility over determining teacher 
salaries are more efficient than schools in which this 
responsibility is held by persons outside of the school, or by 
teachers themselves. This finding is similar to the result in 
Woessman [15] that students in schools with autonomy over 
Table 1. Translog Fixed Effects and OLS Production Function Estimates at the School Level with the Full Sample 
 
  Math Science 
Independent  OLS Fixed Effects OLS Fixed Effects 
Variable Coeff Std Error Coeff Std Error Coeff Std Error Coeff Std Error 
Student's Age 22.139‡ 2.677 7.602‡ 0.903 20.671‡ 2.585 5.843‡ 0.979 
Class Size -1.075‡ 0.251 -0.249 0.177 -1.077‡ 0.309 -0.081 0.173 
Teacher's Experience -0.168 0.204 0.187 0.147 -0.070 0.188 -0.005 0.117 
Student's Sex -0.443‡ 0.137 0.125 0.083 -0.257* 0.145 0.182* 0.102 
Born in Country -0.624† 0.273 0.213 0.179 -0.867‡ 0.313 -0.204 0.225 
Live with both Parents -1.012‡ 0.164 0.080 0.112 -0.819‡ 0.180 -0.054 0.141 
Both Parents born in Country -1.074‡ 0.285 -0.293* 0.170 -0.817‡ 0.299 -0.122 0.207 
Parents' Education (University) 0.288 0.362 0.510* 0.301 -0.122 0.385 -0.140 0.348 
Parents' Education 2 (Secondary) -0.642‡ 0.190 -0.178 0.122 -0.254 0.189 0.208 0.148 
Parents' Education 3 (Master’s) 0.073† 0.030 0.012 0.019 0.051 0.032 0.006 0.023 
Books in Home (1-10) -0.264 0.196 0.137 0.141 -0.415* 0.235 -0.099 0.195 
Books in Home (11-25) -0.890‡ 0.177 -0.325‡ 0.123 -0.593‡ 0.192 -0.186 0.148 
Books in Home (26-100) -0.292 0.188 -0.076 0.115 -0.180 0.185 -0.020 0.121 
Books in Home (101-200) -0.191 0.199 -0.060 0.117 -0.140 0.196 -0.093 0.123 
Teacher's Sex 0.130 0.204 0.367† 0.145 -0.026 0.197 0.157 0.119 
Teacher's Age 1 0.376† 0.164 -0.083 0.111 0.259* 0.147 0.063 0.092 
Teacher's Age 2 0.357† 0.162 -0.071 0.113 0.241* 0.145 0.067 0.091 
Teacher's Age 3 0.285* 0.163 -0.079 0.115 0.221 0.145 0.074 0.091 
Teacher's Age 4 0.307* 0.164 -0.098 0.118 0.200 0.145 0.071 0.091 
Teacher's Age 5 0.343† 0.165 -0.124 0.123 0.229 0.148 0.052 0.092 
Teacher's Education (Bachelor's) -0.324 0.614 0.851† 0.380 -1.884† 0.741 0.126 0.451 
Teacher's Education (Master's) 0.192 0.236 0.091 0.139 0.087 0.246 -0.137 0.146 
Note: Robust standard errors are clustered at the school level. ‡ means significant at the 1% level; † means significant at the 5% level; * means significant at the 10% level. OLS 
regression also includes all institutional arrangements and per capita GDP and expenditure per student. 
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teacher salaries score higher on math and science test scores. 
Additionally, this is also consistent with the hypothesis 
formed in Bishop and Woessman [19] and Fuchs and 
Woessman [20], that decentralization in decision-making 
increases educational efficiency. Although, in this instance it 
appears that decentralization to the school level is beneficial, 
decentralization to the teacher level may be detrimental. The 
positive and significant coefficients on the school dummy for 
determining teacher salaries means that schools that have 
autonomy in hiring teachers are 1.16 to 1.42 percent more 
efficient than schools without this autonomy. 
 Policy Implications: someone within the schools should 
hold the responsibility for purchasing supplies. 
4.1.2. Influences on Curriculum 
 The following variables are known to either have a large 
effect on curriculum or to have no effect on the curriculum. 
The models analyzed here include a dummy variable 
indicating that the variable in question has a large influence 
on the curriculum. 
External Exams 
 The coefficient on external exams is negative in all four 
of the specifications, but these estimates are only statistically 
significant in math. This suggests that allowing external 
exams to influence a school's curriculum is negatively 
associated with efficiency. It has been previously 
Table 2. The Determinants of Efficiency at the School Level (Translog Model) Using OLS and Fixed Effects with the Full Sample 
 
  Math Science 
Independent  OLS Fixed Effects OLS Fixed Effects 
Variable Coeff Std Error Coeff Std Error Coeff Std Error Coeff Std Error 
Responsible for:                 
Hiring Teachers              
  Schools 0.001 0.007 0.012‡ 0.004 0.001 0.007 0.017‡ 0.004 
  Teachers -0.053 0.040 -0.023 0.031 -0.047 0.059 -0.027 0.051 
Deciding School Budget              
  Schools 0.022† 0.009 3.19E-04 0.005 0.026‡ 0.009 0.001 0.006 
  Teachers 0.049† 0.025 0.005 0.019 0.017 0.022 -0.022 0.019 
Purchasing Supplies              
  Schools 0.051‡ 0.013 0.042‡ 0.009 0.062‡ 0.016 0.054‡ 0.010 
  Teachers 0.062‡ 0.014 0.048‡ 0.010 0.083‡ 0.017 0.071‡ 0.011 
Determining Teacher's Salaries              
  Schools 0.009* 0.005 0.012‡ 0.003 0.006 0.005 0.014‡ 0.004 
  Teachers -0.014 0.032 -0.016 0.023 -0.013 0.029 -0.010 0.025 
                 
Influences Curriculum              
  External Exams -0.012* 0.006 -0.009† 0.004 -0.001 0.006 -0.006 0.004 
  Teachers Individually 0.012† 0.006 0.007* 0.004 0.011† 0.005 0.003 0.004 
  Subject Teachers 0.017‡ 0.006 0.012‡ 0.004 0.021‡ 0.006 0.020‡ 0.004 
  Teachers Collectively -0.009 0.006 -0.006 0.004 -0.009 0.005 -0.004 0.004 
  Teachers' Unions -0.056† 0.028 -0.046† 0.020 -0.082‡ 0.031 -0.073‡ 0.023 
                 
Teachers have a large Influence on:              
  Money for Supplies -0.015 0.012 -0.021† 0.008 -0.009 0.010 -0.014* 0.008 
  Kind of Supplies 0.028‡ 0.007 0.019‡ 0.005 0.014† 0.006 0.018‡ 0.005 
  Subject Matter -0.019‡ 0.005 -0.015‡ 0.004 -0.014‡ 0.005 -0.015‡ 0.004 
  Textbook 0.004 0.006 0.006 0.004 0.000 0.005 0.005 0.005 
               
  GDP per capita -3.18E-06‡ 7.30E-07 -8.99E-07‡ 4.60E-07 3.74E-07 8.09E-07 -1.01E-07 5.22E-07 
  Expenditure per student 2.52E-05‡ 2.54E-06 9.70E-05‡ 1.59E-06 7.93E-06‡ 2.73E-06 7.09E-06‡ 1.72E-06 
Note: Robust standard errors are clustered at the school level. ‡ means significant at the 1% level; † means significant at the 5% level; * means significant at the 10% level. OLS 
regressions also included the background variables in Table 1. 
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hypothesized that external exams provide an incentive for 
teachers to work harder and thus lead to higher student 
achievement; this hypothesis was shown to be true in Bishop 
[22]. Additionally, Woessman [23] finds that students in 
countries with central exit exams score significantly higher 
on international achievement tests than students in countries 
without central exit exams. However, it may be that external 
exams force teachers to “teach to the test,” limiting the 
amount of time spent on other important areas (which may 
have been covered on the TIMSS exam), leading to the 
negative relationship found here and in Woessman [15]. The 
negative and significant coefficients on the dummy for 
external exams in math using the fixed effect model tells us 
that schools with influential external exams are 0.929 
percent less efficient than schools without influential 
external exams. 
Teachers Individually 
 The dummy variable indicating that teachers individually 
have a large influence on curriculum has a positive 
coefficient in all four models; however, it is not statistically 
significant in science using the fixed effects model. The 
suggestion here is that allowing teachers to have an 
individual influence on the curriculum is associated with 
higher levels of efficiency. Similarly, Woessman [15] found 
that students in schools where teachers individually had a 
large influence on curriculum score higher in math and 
science tests. Vegas [21] also found student achievement to 
be positively influenced by greater teacher autonomy, but 
only when the decision-making authority is decentralized. 
The fixed effects result in math means that schools where 
teachers individually have a large influence on curriculum 
are 0.707 percent more efficient than schools where teachers 
individually have no influence over curriculum. 
Subject Teachers 
 The coefficients on subject teachers are positive and 
statistically significant in both subjects using both models. 
This is contrary to Woessman’s [15] finding of a significant 
negative relationship between subject teachers influencing 
curriculum and student achievement. This change from 
Woessman [15] could be due to the fact that we do not have 
all of the same variables (e.g. private school enrollment) or it 
could simply be a result of using two different years of data. 
Teachers Collectively 
 The coefficients on the dummy for teachers collectively 
are negative, but statistically insignificant in both subjects 
using both models. These coefficients are of the sign as those 
found in Woessman [15], but his were also found to be 
statistically significant. 
Teachers’ Unions 
 The coefficient on teachers' unions is negative and 
statistically significant in all four models. This finding is 
analogous to the finding in Woessman [15] that allowing 
teachers' unions to have a large influence on curriculum is 
damaging to student achievement. Similarly, Hoxby [24] 
finds that teachers' unions increase the level of educational  
 
inputs, but decrease productivity so much that the net effect 
on student achievement is negative. The fixed effect results 
mean that schools where teachers' unions have a large 
influence on curriculum are 4.6 to 7.28 percent less efficient 
than schools where teachers' unions have no influence over 
curriculum. The coefficient estimate in science is larger than 
the estimates of any of the other institutional arrangements 
and the estimate in math is surpassed in magnitude by only 
the coefficient on teachers holding the responsibility for 
purchasing supplies. Thus, teachers' unions have a very 
strong relationship with school efficiency, relative to the 
other institutional factors. 
 Policy Implications: subject teachers (as a collective) 
should hold a strong influence over the curriculum, while 
teachers’ unions should not have a strong influence over the 
curriculum. 
4.1.3. Teacher Influence 
 Teachers are known to either have a large influence or no 
influence on the following choices. The models analyzed 
here include a dummy variable indicating that teachers have 
a large influence on the choice in question. 
Money for Supplies 
 The coefficients on the dummy variable indicating that 
class teachers have a large influence on money for supplies 
are negative in both subjects and both models, but the 
coefficients are statistically significant only using the fixed 
effects model. This is in contrast to the positive and 
statistically significant effect of teachers influencing money 
for supplies on tests in science found in Woessman [15]. 
Kind of Supplies 
 The dummy variable for teachers holding a large 
influence on the kind of supplies has positive and 
statistically significant coefficients in both subjects using 
both models. These results suggest a positive relationship 
between teachers influencing the kind of supplies and the 
efficiency of the school, which is consistent with the benefits 
to decentralization found in Vegas [21]. The findings in 
Woessman [15] show a positive relationship between 
teachers influencing the kind of supplies and student test 
scores, but only in science. Our results suggest that the 
relationship between teachers influencing the kind of 
supplies and school efficiency is positive across both 
subjects. 
Subject Matter 
 The coefficient on subject matter is negative and 
statistically significant in both subjects using both models. 
Woessman [15] also found a negative coefficient on this 
variable for both math and science test scores, but his 
findings were statistically insignificant. However, these 
results are opposite of what was expected based on the 
positive relationship between decentralization and student 
achievement found in Vegas [21]. Although decentralization 
in general may lead to increased student outcomes, it appears 
that decentralizing the choice of subject matter to the teacher 
level is negatively associated with educational efficiency. 
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Textbook 
 The coefficient estimates on the dummy for teachers 
having a large influence on the choice of textbook are 
statistically insignificant in both subjects using both models. 
These estimates are positive in all but the OLS model in 
science. Thus, the relationship between teachers influencing 
textbook choice and school efficiency is unclear. 
 Policy Implications: teachers should have a strong 
influence over the kind of supplies used in the classroom, but 
they should not have a strong influence over the subject 
matter taught. 
4.1.4. Country Specifics 
 The following are country-level variables thought to 
impact efficiency in education. Some might question why 
these variables are not placed in the first-stage production 
function; however, because these are country-level variables, 
they would be dropped from the school-level fixed effects 
equation we use. 
GDP Per Capita 
 The country's GDP per capita has negative and 
statistically significant coefficients using both models in 
math. In science, this coefficient estimate is positive using 
OLS, but negative using fixed effects; neither of these 
estimates are statistically significant. The result in math is 
opposite of the positive and statistically significant 
relationship between GDP per capita and test scores found in 
Woessman [15]. It could be that students in countries with 
higher standards of living (as measured by GDP per capita) 
have less of an incentive to do well in school. This is likely 
just an association, not a causal finding. 
Expenditures Per Student 
 The variable measuring the level of expenditures per 
student in a country has positive and statistically significant 
coefficients in both subjects using both models. This is 
similar to the finding in Millimet and Collier [25] of robust 
efficiency spillovers across school districts in the same 
county, only when the district operates in a financially 
flexible environment 
4.2. Sensitivity Analysis 
 To assess the sensitivity of our baseline results, we re-
conducted our analysis using two different sub-samples of 
the data: 
(i) OECD Only: using only students from member 
countries of the OECD; and 
(ii) CBEEE Only: using only students from countries that 
have curriculum-based external exit exams 
(CBEEEs). 
 The results of the analysis using only students from 
member countries of the OECD are displayed in Tables 3 
and 4. The results of the analysis using only students from 
countries that have curriculum-based external exit exams 
(CBEEEs) are displayed in Tables 5 and 6. 
 
4.2.1. Distribution of Responsibility 
Responsibility for Hiring Teachers 
 The sub-sample results show drastic changes in the 
coefficient estimates on the dummies for schools and 
teachers holding the responsibility for hiring teachers. When 
we limit the sample to countries within the OECD, the OLS 
estimates in both math and science on the dummy for 
schools being responsible for hiring teachers switch signs 
from the full sample results to negative coefficient estimates; 
only the math result is statistically significant. The fixed 
effect estimate in math on the dummy for schools being 
responsible for hiring teachers is virtually indifferent 
between the full sample and OECD sub-sample, but the 
science estimate in the OECD sub-sample becomes negative 
(but statistically insignificant), whereas it was positive in the 
full sample. 
 The OLS and fixed effects coefficient estimates in 
science on the dummy for teachers being responsible for 
hiring teachers remain negative (as they were in the full 
sample) in the OECD sub-sample, but also become 
statistically significant. In math, this OLS estimate also 
becomes statistically significant, but the fixed effect estimate 
remains positive and statistically insignificant. 
 The coefficient estimates on the dummies for both 
schools and teachers holding the responsibility for hiring 
teachers are negative across both subjects and both models in 
the CBEEE sub-sample, with the coefficient estimates on the 
dummy for teacher responsibility holding statistical 
significance. These changes in the coefficient estimates 
between the full sample and the CBEEE sub-sample are 
similar to the findings in Woessman [26] and Fuchs and 
Woessman [20] that there is strong heterogeneity for the 
effects of school autonomy. 
Responsibility for Deciding School Budget 
 The coefficient estimates on the school dummy for 
deciding school budget remains positive for the fixed effects 
model in math and science across both sub-samples; and 
gains statistical significance in the CBEEE sub-sample. 
These estimates remain positive across all sub-samples in 
both subjects for the OLS model except for the OECD sub-
sample in math, which results in a negative, but statistically 
insignificant coefficient estimate. 
 The coefficient estimates on the teacher dummy for 
deciding school budget become larger and more positive in 
both models with the CBEEE sub-sample for math and 
science. On the contrary, these estimates become smaller or 
more negative for the OECD sub-sample across both 
subjects and models. 
 These results suggest that the relationships between 
decentralized responsibility for deciding school budgets 
(either at the school or teacher level) and both school 
efficiency and student achievement are of a greater 
magnitude for schools with CBEEEs. 
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Responsibility for Purchasing Supplies 
 The coefficients on the school and teacher dummies for 
purchasing supplies in math become insignificant in both 
sub-samples using both models. Alternatively, the school 
dummies for purchasing supplies in science are negative and 
significant in the OECD sub-sample using both OLS and 
fixed effects models. The coefficients on the teacher 
dummies in science with the OECD sub-sample are also 
negative for both models, but do not have statistical 
significance. The coefficients on the teacher dummies in 
science with the CBEEE sub-sample remain positive and 
statistically significant in both models, as they were in the 
full sample. 
 This suggests that the optimal level of responsibility for 
purchasing supplies is highly dependent on other factors, 
including the subject and the presence of CBEEEs. There 
also appears to be some unknown factors present in OECD 
countries that are not present in the other countries included 
in the full sample that impact the relationship between the 
responsibility for purchasing supplies and both student 
achievement and school efficiency. 
Responsibility for Teacher Salaries 
 There are two changes in the coefficients on the school 
and teacher dummies for deciding teacher salaries using the 
sub-samples. First, the CBEEE sub-sample estimate in math 
on the teacher dummy is positive and statistically significant 
in both models, whereas these coefficients were negative and 
statistically insignificant using the full sample. Second, the 
OECD sub-sample estimate in science on the teacher 
dummy is negative and statistically significant in both 
models, whereas these coefficients were negative and 
statistically insignificant using the full sample. Again, there 
appears to be unknown factors present in OECD countries 
that are not present in the other countries in the full sample 
that are impacting our results. Additionally, the presence of 
CBEEEs seems to alter the relationships between 
institutional arrangements and student achievement and 
school efficiency. This is further evidence of the finding in 
Woessman [26] of strong heterogeneity for the effects of 
school autonomy. 
 Policy Implications: teachers in OECD countries should 
not be responsible for hiring science teachers or for 
Table 3. Translog Fixed Effects and OLS Production Function Estimates at the School Level with the Only Countries in the 
OECD 
 
  Math Science 
Independent  OLS Fixed Effects OLS Fixed Effects 
Variable Coeff Std Error Coeff Std Error Coeff Std Error Coeff Std Error 
Student's Age 6.711‡ 1.797 6.744‡ 1.074 6.239‡ 1.665 5.130‡ 1.241 
Class Size -1.675‡ 0.306 0.053 0.272 -1.117‡ 0.320 -0.529* 0.274 
Teacher's Experience -0.230 0.189 8.449‡ 4.210 -0.241 0.164 -0.151 0.136 
Student's Sex -0.230* 0.123 0.069 0.093 -0.255† 0.122 -0.029 0.103 
Born in Country 0.316 0.255 0.552‡ 0.209 0.157 0.255 0.269 0.220 
Live with both Parents -0.930‡ 0.192 0.127 0.151 -0.990‡ 0.217 -0.308* 0.177 
Both Parents born in Country -0.522† 0.261 -0.332* 0.194 -0.322 0.268 -0.191 0.220 
Parents' Education (University) 0.537 0.547 0.841† 0.425 0.334 0.700 0.752 0.633 
Parents' Education 2 (Secondary) 0.048 0.203 -0.341† 0.151 -0.105 0.202 -0.124 0.175 
Parents' Education 3 (Master’s) 0.123‡ 0.046 0.025 0.026 0.120‡ 0.032 0.056 0.028 
Books in Home (1-10) 0.267 0.241 0.086 0.201 0.094 0.255 0.009 0.232 
Books in Home (11-25) -0.483‡ 0.182 -0.315† 0.149 -0.187 0.200 -0.112 0.171 
Books in Home (26-100) -0.226 0.164 -0.098 0.127 -0.122 0.164 -0.014 0.136 
Books in Home (101-200) -0.130 0.167 0.042 0.124 -0.022 0.169 0.041 0.142 
Teacher's Sex 0.445† 0.179 20.210† 10.037 -0.015 0.165 0.155 0.146 
Teacher's Age 1 0.246* 0.142 -9.858† 5.012 0.217 0.138 0.209* 0.113 
Teacher's Age 2 0.217 0.142 -9.846† 5.011 0.213 0.137 0.208* 0.113 
Teacher's Age 3 0.190 0.142 -9.850† 5.011 0.218 0.136 0.215* 0.112 
Teacher's Age 4 0.197 0.142 -9.854† 5.012 0.198 0.135 0.208* 0.112 
Teacher's Age 5 0.202 0.143 -9.889† 5.012 0.215 0.136 0.181 0.113 
Teacher's Education (Bachelor's) -0.521 0.905 -  - 0.721 1.022 1.473† 0.741 
Teacher's Education (Master's) 0.795‡ 0.198 0.309* 0.160 0.564‡ 0.192 0.028 0.162 
Note: Robust standard errors are clustered at the school level. ‡ means significant at the 1% level; † means significant at the 5% level; * means significant at 
the 10% level. OLS regression also includes all institutional arrangements and per capita GDP and expenditure per student. 
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determining science teacher salaries. Similarly, teachers 
should not be responsible for hiring science or math teachers 
when CBEEs are present. School administrators should be 
responsible for deciding school budgets and determining 
teachers’ salaries when CBEEs are present. However, the 
responsibility for purchasing science supplies should not be 
held by school administrators in OECD countries. 
4.2.2. Influences on Curriculum 
External Exams 
 The coefficients on external exams remain negative 
across both models and both sub-samples in math, but the 
only statistically significant estimate in the sub-samples 
using math scores occurs with the OLS model in the OECD 
sub-sample. The coefficient estimates on this variable in 
science are actually positive and statistically significant for 
the CBEEE sub-sample across both models; while these 
estimates are statistically insignificant for the OECD sub-
sample across both models. This suggests that the 
relationship between external exams and student 
achievement and school efficiency are different for countries 
with and without curriculum based external exit exams and 
across subjects. 
Teachers Individually 
 There are no changes in the signs of the coefficient 
estimates on the dummy variable for teachers individually 
influencing curriculum across the OECD and CBEEE sub-
samples. This suggests that allowing teachers greater control 
over the curriculum is beneficial to students in OECD and 
non-OECD countries and in countries with and without 
CBEEEs. 
Subject Teachers 
 There is only one change in the signs of the coefficient 
estimates on the dummy variable for subject teachers 
influencing curriculum across the OECD and CBEEE sub-
samples. The coefficient estimate on subject teachers in 
science using the fixed effects model with the OECD sub-
sample is negative, but statistically insignificant. This tells us 
that the positive relationship found in the full sample is fairly 
robust to sample selection. 
 
Table 4. Translog Fixed Effects and OLS Production Function Estimates at the School Level with the Only Countries that have 
CBEEEs 
 
  Math Science 
Independent  OLS Fixed Effects OLS Fixed Effects 
Variable Coeff Std Error Coeff Std Error Coeff Std Error Coeff Std Error 
Student's Age 8.606‡ 1.767 5.761‡ 1.062 7.326‡ 1.840 4.867‡ 1.230 
Class Size -1.475‡ 0.325 -0.601‡ 0.208 -1.221‡ 0.365 -0.391 0.283 
Teacher's Experience -0.322 0.226 0.117 0.145 -0.503‡ 0.182 -0.132 0.132 
Student's Sex -0.317† 0.130 0.002 0.097 -0.163 0.136 0.040 0.109 
Born in Country 0.242 0.315 0.328 0.204 0.314 0.262 0.210 0.222 
Live with both Parents -0.847‡ 0.206 -0.157 0.158 -0.966‡ 0.240 -0.414† 0.186 
Both Parents born in Country -0.940‡ 0.292 -0.514‡ 0.194 -0.895‡ 0.275 -0.296 0.220 
Parents' Education (University) 0.502 0.647 0.430 0.530 1.399 0.860 0.632 0.654 
Parents' Education 2 (Secondary) 0.258 0.235 -0.420† 0.174 0.497* 0.265 0.028 0.200 
Parents' Education 3 (Master’s) 0.086‡ 0.032 0.010 0.023 0.112‡ 0.033 0.048* 0.026 
Books in Home (1-10) 0.132 0.277 0.368 0.227 -0.347 0.302 -0.109 0.265 
Books in Home (11-25) -0.278 0.225 -0.358† 0.175 0.047 0.230 0.011 0.191 
Books in Home (26-100) -0.157 0.174 -0.031 0.128 0.107 0.182 -0.002 0.141 
Books in Home (101-200) -0.165 0.165 0.158 0.123 -0.045 0.175 0.130 0.139 
Teacher's Sex 0.590‡ 0.228 0.469‡ 0.155 0.162 0.207 0.353† 0.151 
Teacher's Age 1 0.436† 0.180 -0.038 0.116 0.585‡ 0.161 0.165 0.111 
Teacher's Age 2 0.410† 0.181 -0.021 0.117 0.566‡ 0.158 0.165 0.110 
Teacher's Age 3 0.376† 0.181 -0.020 0.120 0.567‡ 0.158 0.174 0.109 
Teacher's Age 4 0.383† 0.181 -0.044 0.125 0.549‡ 0.157 0.173 0.109 
Teacher's Age 5 0.385† 0.182 -0.061 0.128 0.548‡ 0.158 0.138 0.111 
Teacher's Education (Bachelor's) 0.375 0.803 -0.629 0.506 -1.035 0.823 -0.735 0.694 
Teacher's Education (Master's) 0.723‡ 0.221 0.475‡ 0.158 0.542† 0.236 0.017 0.177 
Note: Robust standard errors are clustered at the school level. ‡ means significant at the 1% level; † means significant at the 5% level; * means significant at the 10% level. OLS 
regression also includes all institutional arrangements and per capita GDP and expenditure per student. 
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Teachers Collectively 
 The coefficients on the dummy for teachers collectively 
remain negative across all estimates using the sub-samples. 
These coefficients actually gain statistical significance in the 
OECD sub-sample with both models in science and for the 
OLS model only in math. Only the fixed effects estimate in 
math holds statistical significance in the CBEEE sub-sample. 
It appears that the relationships between allowing teachers to 
collectively influence the curriculum and student 
achievement and school efficiency are of different 
magnitudes across different samples of countries. 
Teachers’ Unions 
 The coefficient estimates on teachers' unions remain 
negative across both sub-samples using both models in math  
 
and science. These estimates are also statistically significant 
in all but the OECD sub-sample estimates in math. Thus, 
teachers' unions not only have a very strong relationship with 
school efficiency, relative to the other institutional factors, 
but also maintain this strong relationship across different 
sub-samples of countries. 
 Policy Implications: neither teachers collectively nor 
teachers’ unions should have a strong influence over science 
curriculum in OECD countries. Similarly, teachers’ unions 
should not have a strong influence over math or science 
curriculum when CBEEs are present. Alternatively, 
individual teachers should have a strong influence over 
curriculum when CBEEs are present. Lastly, subject teachers 
and external exams should have a strong influence over 
science curriculum when CBEEs are present. 
 
Table 5.  The Determinants of Efficiency at the School Level (Translog Model) using OLS and Fixed Effects in OECD Countries 
 
  Math Science 
Independent  OLS Fixed Effects OLS Fixed Effects 
Variable Coeff Std Error Coeff Std Error Coeff Std Error Coeff Std Error 
Responsible for:                 
Hiring Teachers              
  Schools -0.012† 0.005 0.002 0.002 -0.003 0.005 -0.001 0.004 
  Teachers -0.104‡ 0.014 0.001 0.002 -0.074‡ 0.026 -0.050* 0.028 
Deciding School Budget              
  Schools -0.006 0.008 0.001 0.001 0.005 0.009 0.002 0.006 
  Teachers 0.007 0.014 -3.72E-04 0.001 -0.016 0.017 -0.006 0.014 
Purchasing Supplies              
  Schools -0.011 0.011 -1.65E-04 4.46E-04 -0.031‡ 0.009 -0.023‡ 0.008 
  Teachers -2.84E-04 0.011 3.93E-05 4.27E-04 -0.011 0.010 -0.002 0.009 
Determining Teacher's Salaries              
  Schools 0.010† 0.004 -0.002 0.002 0.006 0.004 0.007† 0.003 
  Teachers -0.040 0.030 -0.002 0.002 -0.054† 0.023 -0.060‡ 0.022 
Influences Curriculum              
  External Exams -0.017‡ 0.005 1.14E-04 1.60E-04 0.003 0.005 -0.001 0.004 
  Teachers Individually 0.011† 0.004 0.003 0.003 0.007* 0.004 0.005 0.003 
  Subject Teachers 0.020‡ 0.005 -0.001 0.001 0.024 0.005 0.021‡ 0.004 
  Teachers Collectively -0.011† 0.005 -0.001 0.001 -0.009† 0.004 -0.012‡ 0.004 
  Teachers' Unions -0.043 0.032 -0.001 0.002 -0.070‡ 0.026 -0.064‡ 0.021 
Teachers have a large Influence on:              
  Money for Supplies -0.022† 0.010 -0.004 0.004 -0.003 0.006 0.000 0.007 
  Kind of Supplies 0.016‡ 0.005 0.004 0.004 0.010† 0.004 0.009† 0.004 
  Subject Matter -0.001 0.005 0.002 0.002 -0.008† 0.004 -0.005 0.004 
  Textbook 0.014‡ 0.005 -0.002 0.002 0.015‡ 0.004 0.013‡ 0.004 
  GDP per capita -8.12E-06‡ 6.62E-07 -6.91E-08 6.98E-08 -4.56E-06‡ 7.01E-07 -9.01E-07‡ 5.07E-07 
  Expenditure per student 2.81E-05‡ 2.33E-06 -1.04E-07 1.16E-07 1.33E-05‡ 2.32E-06 -1.41E-07 1.66E-06 
Note: Robust standard errors are clustered at the school level.  ‡ means significant at the 1% level; † means significant at the 5% level; * means significant at the 10% level.  OLS 
regressions also included the background variables in Table 3. 
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4.2.3. Teacher Influence 
Money for Supplies 
 The coefficients on the dummy variable indicating that 
class teachers have a large influence on money for supplies 
remain negative for all of the sub-sample estimates in math. 
However, the CBEEE estimates in science are positive using 
both models and the OECD estimate in math using the fixed 
effects model in science in positive. Although these 
estimates do change signs from the full sample to the sub-
samples in science, none of these estimates are statistically 
significant. It appears that the effect of giving teachers a 
large influence over money for supplies is largely dependent 
on subject, whether or not the country has curriculum based 
external exit exams and other unobservable factors in OECD 
countries. 
Kind of Supplies 
 The sub-sample coefficient estimates on the dummy 
variable for teachers holding a large influence on the kind of 
supplies are largely unchanged from their full sample 
counterparts. All of these estimates remain positive, 
however, the CBEEE estimates in science are statistically 
insignificant. This suggests that our full sample finding is 
mostly robust to sample selection, although the estimate is 
less precise for the CBEEE sub-sample in science. 
Subject Matter 
 The coefficient estimates on subject matter are mostly 
negative in the sub-sample models; however, they lack the 
statistical significance that was present in the full sample. 
Thus, it may be that the presence of curriculum based 
external exit exams and unobservable factors in OECD 
Table 6. The Determinants of Efficiency at the School Level (Translog Model) Using OLS and Fixed Effects in Countries with 
CBEEEs 
 
  Math Science 
Independent  OLS Fixed Effects OLS Fixed Effects 
Variable Coeff Std Error Coeff Std Error Coeff Std Error Coeff Std Error 
Responsible for:                 
Hiring Teachers              
  Schools -0.007 0.007 -0.010† 0.004 -0.001 0.007 -0.005 0.005 
  Teachers -0.100‡ 0.011 -0.096‡ 0.006 -0.066‡ 0.013 -0.082‡ 0.007 
Deciding School Budget              
  Schools 0.034‡ 0.009 0.014‡ 0.006 0.027† 0.011 0.019‡ 0.007 
  Teachers 0.065‡ 0.016 0.052‡ 0.010 0.025 0.019 0.036‡ 0.014 
Purchasing Supplies              
  Schools 0.008 0.018 0.002 0.011 0.033 0.023 0.018 0.013 
  Teachers 0.028 0.019 0.014 0.011 0.058† 0.023 0.040‡ 0.014 
Determining Teacher's Salaries              
  Schools 0.018‡ 0.004 0.015‡ 0.003 0.014‡ 0.004 0.014‡ 0.003 
  Teachers 0.040‡ 0.015 0.030‡ 0.010 0.016 0.014 0.012 0.011 
Influences Curriculum              
  External Exams -0.001 0.006 -0.004 0.004 0.015‡ 0.005 0.008† 0.004 
  Teachers Individually 0.024‡ 0.005 0.018‡ 0.004 0.017‡ 0.005 0.013‡ 0.004 
  Subject Teachers 0.005 0.006 0.003 0.004 0.013† 0.006 0.013‡ 0.004 
  Teachers Collectively -0.004 0.006 -0.006* 0.004 -0.006 0.005 -0.006 0.004 
  Teachers' Unions -0.049* 0.026 -0.038† 0.018 -0.075‡ 0.023 -0.068‡ 0.019 
Teachers have a large Influence on:              
  Money for Supplies -0.006 0.011 -0.004 0.008 0.007 0.007 0.011 0.008 
  Kind of Supplies 0.015† 0.007 0.009† 0.005 0.006 0.005 0.004 0.005 
  Subject Matter -0.006 0.005 0.001 0.004 -0.004 0.004 -0.003 0.004 
  Textbook -4.56E-04 0.006 -0.003 0.004 0.002 0.005 0.003 0.005 
  GDP per capita -1.00E-06 1.01E-06 7.02E-07 6.34E-07 -1.37E-06 1.04E-06 5.71E-07 7.76E-07 
  Expenditure per student 1.66E-06 3.96E-06 -3.23E-06 2.45E-06 1.03E-06 3.90E-06 -5.58E-06* 2.91E-06 
Note: Robust standard errors are clustered at the school level. ‡ means significant at the 1% level; † means significant at the 5% level; * means significant at the 10% level. OLS 
regressions also included the background variables in Table 4. 
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countries diminish the impact of teachers holding influence 
over subject matter. 
Textbook 
 The coefficient estimates on the dummy for teachers 
having a large influence on the choice of textbook are 
positive and statistically significant in the OECD sub-sample 
models using OLS for both subjects and using fixed effects 
in science. Both models result in positive coefficients with 
the CBEEE sub-sample for science, but negative coefficients 
for this sub-sample in math. It appears that the effects of 
giving teachers a large influence over the textbook is largely 
dependent on subject, whether or not the country has 
curriculum based external exit exams and other unobservable 
factors in OECD countries. 
 Policy Implications: teachers should have a large 
influence over the kind of supplies and textbook used in 
science classes in OECD countries. 
4.2.4. Country Specifics 
GDP Per Capita 
 The coefficient estimate on a country’s GDP per capita in 
science is negative and statistically significant using both 
models for the OECD sub-sample. This result could be due 
to the fact that OECD countries have higher GDP per capita 
in general, but clearly does not indicate that countries should 
try to lower their GDP per capita in an attempt to increase 
academic success. The remaining sub-sample estimates for 
GDP per capita are largely statistically insignificant and 
mostly uninteresting. 
Expenditures Per Student 
 The variable measuring the level of expenditures per 
student in a country has negative coefficients in all of the 
sub-sample estimates using the fixed effects model; 
including the CBEEE sub-sample estimate in science, which 
is statistically significant. This is in contrast to the positive 
and statistically significant findings for the full sample. The 
OLS sub-sample results are all positive, while the fixed 
effects sub-sample results are all negative. Thus, it could be 
that more spending on education is beneficial to student 
achievement, but that this spending is often inefficient. This 
also shows that there may be unobservable factors in OECD 
countries and other important characteristics of some 
countries (e.g. the presence CBEEEs) that play an important 
role in educational production function modeling. 
CONCLUSION 
 Increased student achievement has been linked to 
increased economic growth, and thus has become a primary 
objective for most developed countries. Unfortunately, 
researchers have found scant evidence of factors within the 
control of policymakers that can increase student 
achievement. In fact, significant increases in per pupil 
expenditures in the United States over recent decades have 
not lead to any discernible increases in student test scores 
over the same period. Following the work of Woessman [15] 
and Collier and Millimet [9], this paper seeks to further our 
knowledge of the effects of institutional characteristics that 
may not vary within the United States. The TIMSS 1999 
dataset (a compilation of over 120,000 students from 28 
countries) is analyzed to determine whether an indirect 
relationship exists between institutional arrangements and 
student test scores, via a relationship with educational 
efficiency. 
 This paper uses two different educational models; one, 
ordinary least squares, includes the institutional 
characteristics as variables that directly influence student 
achievement; the other, a fixed effects model, first estimates 
the level of efficiency in each school then estimates the 
relationship between the institutional characteristics and 
school efficiency. Differences in the coefficient estimates of 
institutional characteristics between the two models are 
minimal, but do exist. The coefficients on: schools holding 
the responsibility for hiring teachers and determining 
teachers’ salaries, and teachers holding a large influence on 
money for supplies are all statistically significant in the fixed 
effects model, but not so in the OLS model for both math 
and science. The opposite, statistical significance in the OLS 
model, is true of teachers individually influencing the 
curriculum in both math and science. In none of these 
instances do the signs of the coefficients differ and hold 
statistical significance. Thus, differences do result from 
using the two models, but it is not clear which model is 
necessarily preferred. This analysis does provide robust 
estimates for some institutional arrangements with consistent 
coefficient estimates across both models in both subjects. 
Our results suggest that: both teachers and schools holding 
the responsibility for purchasing supplies, subject teachers 
holding a strong influence over the curriculum and teachers 
having a strong influence over the kind of supplies used in 
the classroom are all positively associated with student 
achievement and school efficiency. Teachers’ unions and 
teachers holding a strong influence over the subject matter 
are both negatively associated with student achievement and 
school efficiency. 
 Our specification analysis using sub-samples of the full 
data suggest that there are important differences in OECD 
and non-OECD countries that are not attributable to 
observable institutional arrangements. Additionally, 
curriculum-based external exit exams (CBEEEs) appear to 
have an important impact not only on student achievement, 
but also on the relationship between institutional 
arrangements and student achievement. Similar to 
Woessman [26], we find differing relationships between 
some of our institutional arrangements and school efficiency 
(as well as student achievement) between countries with and 
without CBEEEs. 
 Despite the differences between our approach and 
Woessman’s [15] approach, it is clear that institutional 
arrangements are significantly related to educational 
production. Consistent findings across Woessman [15], 
Collier and Millimet [9], and the current paper include: 
school autonomy in purchasing supplies has a positive 
relationship with student achievement and efficiency; and 
teachers' unions having a large influence on curriculum is 
associated with lower levels of student achievement and 
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school efficiency. In fact, this paper finds that a large 
influence on curriculum by teachers' unions has a stronger 
negative association on school efficiency than any of the 
other institutional arrangements analyzed in this paper. 
Future research to determine the exact relationship between 
institutional arrangements and student achievement could 
provide more concrete answers for the contradictory 
evidence across the three studies mentioned above. 
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